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Abstract:
Purpose: Alliance between manufacturing and logistics industry is a new model of  the joint
development of  the two industries. A reasonable profit allocation mechanism is the key to
ensure the stable operation of  the alliance, as well as to achieve the desired objectives. Based on
uncertainty of  alliance expected return as well as the inherent features of  the alliance, this
research establishes an improved model of  profit allocation in manufacturing and logistics
industry alliance.
Design/methodology/approach: This article studies how to introduce comprehensive
correction factors to improve interval Shapley value method, which is based on the fact that
had been proved by exiting studies. In this study, interval Shapley value method is first applied
to calculate the initial allocation of  fuzzy cooperative games. Next AHP-GEM method and
fuzzy comprehensive evaluation method are incorporated. Based on those results, an improved
model of  profit allocation is established. After that, a case study is demonstrated the
practicality and feasibility of  the improved model.
Findings: Profit allocation is a complex issue in fuzzy cooperative games. There’re impacts
from partner risk sharing, collaborative effort，market competition, innovative contribution as
well as resource investment. All these factors should be involved in the profit allocation, and
different factors have different weight in importance.
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Practical implications: The new model established in the paper is more scientific and
reasonable, and more in line with the actual situation. This method also provides good
incentives to each enterprise to ensure the healthy and stable development of  the alliance.
Originality/value: Based on alliance characteristics, this paper establishes an indicator system
and a new model for profit allocation in manufacturing and logistics industry alliance, using
AHP-GEM method. 
Keywords: manufacturing and logistics industry, fuzzy cooperative games, improved interval Shapley
value, AHP-GEM method, profit allocation
1. Introduction
In recent years, the joint development of manufacturing and logistics industry has attracted
widespread attention of the domestic and foreign scholars. Existing studies are mainly focused
on the theoretical explanation of the cooperation between manufacturing and logistics industry,
two industry joint development model, joint development strategy as well as the joint
development empirical analysis, etc. Studies on profit allocation between manufacturing and
logistics industry are very rare. Existing study on manufacturing and logistics industry profit
allocation is mainly about pricing on logistics outsourcing. For example, Ni (2007) established
the logistics outsourcing payoff matrix. Using game theory, Luo and Mao (2010), established
pricing game model of logistics outsourcing for both sides, and provided the equilibrium
solution. Chen and Li (2011) designed logistics outsourcing profit sharing incentive contract
based on specific investment. Manufacturing and logistics industry alliance is constraint by
agreements, compliances based on common interests. Members collaborate with each other
under the promise of information sharing. As a result, the alliance can be a cooperative game.
Profit allocation based on logistics outsourcing will only intensify competition between the two
industries. Therefore, this method does not solve the profit allocation problem in
manufacturing and logistics industry cooperative games. Shapley Value method is widely
applied to solve the n-person cooperative game cooperative gains allocation.
Cooperative game can be divided into two categories (Meng & Zhang, 2011): the classical
cooperative game and fuzzy cooperative game. In reality, because of the complexity of the
cooperation process, the uncertainty of decision-making environment, the ambiguity of
problem understanding, and the incompleteness of information, n-person game theory
research in fuzzy environment has become a hot topic in current game theory research. Fuzzy
cooperative game research mainly focuses on two aspects (Tan, 2011): the research of n-
person cooperative game with fuzzy coalition; the research of n-person cooperative game with
fuzzy coalition value.
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The core issue in any cooperative game is about cooperative profit allocation. Considering
alliance profit uncertainty due to the partner’s fuzzy preference, Mares (2001) explored fuzzy
returns, obtained the Shapley value of fuzzy membership function. Surajit (2008) studied
cooperative games with fuzzy coalition and fuzzy payment from fuzzy alliance perspective. The
cooperative game with interval payment is a special kind of fuzzy cooperative game. Chen and
Zhang (2006) used fuzzy math theory proposed a fuzzy Shapley value that can meet validity,
symmetry and additive requirements. Yu and Zhang (2008) analyzed the circumstances when
the cooperative game payoff function is an interval value, he also proposed the Shapley value
with interval pay. Through establishment of an axiomatic system, Tan (2010) studied Shapley
value with interval payment under universal condition. 
This article studies how to introduce comprehensive correction factors to improve interval
Shapley value method, which is based on the fact that had been proved by exiting studies that
there’s uncertainty of alliance expected return as well as the inherent features of the
manufacturing and logistics industry. The article also establishes an improved model of profit
allocation in fuzzy cooperative games in manufacturing and logistics industry. Also, the article
takes manufacturing and logistics alliance as example, demonstrates the practicality and
feasibility of the improved model.
2. The Introduction of the Interval Payoff Cooperation Game and the Interval
Shapley Value Method
Two-tuples (N, V) is called the fuzzy cooperation game of the players set N={1,2,...n}, and V
is the fuzzy payoff function which is defined on the power set P(N) of N, and values in the
interval set R, that means V: P(N)®R, and V(⌀) = 0. The interval payoff function V(S)=[V-
(S),V+(S)] means that the maximum profit interval which each player can obtain through
cooperation of the coalition S Î P(N). Interval fuzzy cooperation game set is marked as GI(N)
(Yu & Zhang, 2008). Here, suppose "S Í N, V(S) 0.
• Definition 1: For the cooperation game GI(N) with the interval payoff, if
"TÎP(N),SÎP(N)  all conform with (meet the condition) V(TS) = V(T), then S can be
called the carrier. 
• Definition 2: Suppose N={1,2,...n}, for any VÎGI(N) ,the Shapley value with interval
coalition value n-persons games V is a vector function j : GI(N)®(R)nP(N) which conforms
with following system of axioms, and j = ( j1,..., j n).
Axiom1 (interval validity): for any carrier S of V , then ∑
i∈S
ϕ¯ (V¯)=V¯ (S) .
Axiom2 (interval symmetry): for any permutation p and iÎN then jp(i)(V) = ji(V).
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Axiom3 (interval superposition): for any two cooperation games V1,V2ÎG1(N) then
ji(V1+V2) = ji(V1)+ji(V2),"iÎN.
Proposition 1: The defined vector function j :G1(N)®(Rn)P(N), j (V) = (j1(V),...,jN(V)),
ji(V) = ∑
i∈S∈p(N)
γ s (V(S)⊝V(S\{i})) is the vector of the Shapley value of the game V. In
the formula gs = (s−1)! (n−s)!
n!
, and s is the person number of the coalition S, n is the
player number of the game, "iÎN,
j+i(V) = ∑
i∈S∈p(N)
γ s (V+(S)-V+(S\{i})), j-i(V) = ∑
i∈S∈p(N)
γ s (V-(S)-V-(S\{i})) (1)
The proof process can be seen in the reference (Tan, 2010).Here, a new interval
number subtraction (Tan, 2010) Θ： x Θ y = [x- -y-,x+ -y+] is defined, which can be
regarded as a inverse operation of interval number addition. For any a0 positive
number, x Θ y Î R, then a(x Θ y) = ax Θ ay .It should be noted that if this method is
taken, x-y  x+-y- may be possible. 
• Definition 3: For strategy (N, V), if the vector function j :G1(N)®(Rn)P(N) and
j = ( j1,..., jn) is called an allocation of cooperation games with interval payment, then
the following requirements should be met: 
(1.1) (1.2)
Therefore, it’s easy to prove that the interval Shapley value is a natural fuzzy continuation of
the Shapley value of the classic cooperation game, and it is more realistic to reality to use
interval number to represent the payoff function (Tan, 2010). 
3. Improved Interval Shapley Value Method for Profit Allocation of the Manufacturing
and Logistics Industry Fuzzy Cooperative Games
Interval Shapley value method is able to reflect the overall contribution as well as the
importance of the collaborators in cooperation. It also provides a good reference for the
uncertainty cooperation allocation of the income. However, this method fails to subdivide the
contribution factors, nor weights differently among different factors. It is simply reflects the
fuzzy contribution from the collaborators. In the joint development of manufacture and
logistics industry, risk sharing, collaborative efforts, market competition, innovative
contribution and resource investment affect the profit allocation. All these factors should be
involved in the profit allocation, and different factors have different weight in importance.
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Therefore, it is necessary to improve the interval Shapley Value method.
This paper first carries out preliminary profit allocation in manufacturing and logistics industry
fuzzy cooperative games based on Interval Shapley Value method in proposition 1, the result
of this exercise is then used as one of the evaluation factors for the final profit allocation. Next,
the weights of each profit allocation factors are determined using AHP-GEM (Analytic Hierarchy
Process and Group Eigenvalue Method) (Qiu, 1997). Furthermore, the profit allocation impact
factor is calculated with fuzzy comprehensive evaluation method for each partner. By
introducing the correction factor, the paper establishes improved model of the profit allocation
for manufacturing and logistics industry fuzzy cooperative games.
3.1. Determine Profit Allocation Evaluation Factor and its Weight
Here are the steps to determine profit allocation evaluation factor and its weight in fuzzy
cooperative games using AHP-GEM (Qiu, 1997).
3.3.1. Select Evaluation Factors and Create a Hierarchical Structure
Based on the nature of each alliance partner, select evaluation factors, and construct a
hierarchical model of profit allocation indicator index, including Goal Layer, Criteria Layer and
Indicator Layer. 
3.3.2. Construct Subject Expert Evaluation Matrix
Based on the hierarchical structure, construct an evaluation matrix for the Criteria Layer and a
diode matrix for Indicator Layer based on Criteria Layer. The method for constructing
evaluation matrix is as follows: m experts from expert group G provide evaluations of n
indicators to construct the order matrix m x n, as follows X = [xab]mxn, in which, Xab Î [a,b] (a =
1,2...,m; b = 1,2,...,n) is the evaluation given by the expert to the indicator b.
Determine Relative Weight. Based on the calculation of single weight for the indicators in
Criteria Layer, normalize to get the relative weights of evaluation indicators. The calculation
process is: Raise a transposed evaluation matrix X to get F, that is F = XT X, the corresponding
eigenvector of the max eigenvalue of F is the optimal decision X*. Above process is based on
the construction of an ideal expert model. 
Definition of an ideal expert: an expert that has the smallest sum of angles between his
scoring vector and the scoring vectors of the other experts in a group is called the ideal or
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optimal expert of the group.
An ideal expert model: Based on the definition of an ideal expert, the optimal decision X* is the
vector for the formula f=∑
i=1
m
(bT xi)
2  at a max value. In the formula, "b = (b1,b2,...,bn) Î En,
mean ∀b∈En ,max
b∈Ex
∑
i=1
m
(bTxi)
2=ρmax , max is the max eigenvalue of the matrix F = X
T X, X* is
corresponding eigenvector XT X of max, and │X*│ = 1.
Solution for the ideal expert model: There’re two common solutions out of the many solutions
to the ideal expert model. One is to determine accuracy requirement , and then to run iteration
calculation of the matrix F using the power method in numerical algebra to get X*. The other is
to use software to calculate the max positive eigenvalue max of the matrix F, then X* is the
positive eigenvector that max is corresponding to F.
3.3.3. Determine Combined Weight of Indicator Layer Relative to the Overall Goal
Layer
The weights of each indicator in the Indicator Layer, Cij(i=1,2,...,k,j=1,2,...,t), to the Goal
Layer is the product of the indicator weight and its weight in the Criteria Layer. Which is wij=wi ·
wij, wi is the weight of the indicator Ci in the Criteria Layer to the Goal Layer, wij is the weight of
the indicator Cij in the Indicator Layer to the indicator in the Criteria Layer. The weight vector of
each indicator for Indicator Layer of the alliance profit allocation is W=[w1,...,wi,...,wk]. When
wiÎ[0,1] and ∑
i=1
k
wi=1 , the combination weight vector for the Indicator Layer is
Wi=[wi1,...,wij,...,wit] , wij Î [0,1], and ∑wij=1 . When W'i=wi1,...,wij,...,wit,∑
j=1
t
wj
i=1 .
Clearly, the combination of AHP and GEM methods keeps the process of scientific analysis in
the hierarchical structure of AHP, while avoiding the inconsistencies in the construction of Saaty
Matrix, making multi-criteria decision-making more scientific and accurate.
3.2. Determine the Profit Allocation Comprehensive Impact Factors
Here are the three steps to establish profit allocation comprehensive impact factors using fuzzy
comprehensive evaluation method.
-453-
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management – http://dx.doi.org/10.3926/jiem.1030
• Establish review set V. The review set is divided into five levels, which is
V=(V1,V2,V3,V4,V5) = (High, medium high, medium, medium low, low) = (0.9, 0.7, 0.5,
0.3. 0.1).
• Develop membership subset. Have subject experts evaluate the various factors
referring to review set to get fuzzy subset Ri=(ri1,...,rij,...,ri5) . Ri refers to the
membership of the i-th indicators in the corresponding reviews set, which is r ij =
number of people on the i-th indicator choose Vi level / number of all people participate.
Fuzzy evaluation matrix R is calculated after fuzzy transformation. 
• Finally, apply fuzzy arithmetic on the fuzzy evaluation matrix and factors weight vector
sets W, get fuzzy comprehensive evaluation result sets B, B=W Θ R .Then using fuzzy
allocation method to normalize the indicators, gets B'= (b1,b2,b3,b4,b5). Next, the
impact factor of the profit allocation of manufacturing and logistics industry alliance is
Pi=B'VT, and also is normalized to get P'i.
3.3. Improved Interval Shapley Value Method with the Correction Factor
Without considering the risk sharing, collaborative effort, market competition, innovative
contribution and resource investment, in the manufacturing and logistics industry alliance that
composed of enterprises, each enterprise has the same impact on the profit allocation, which is
1/n. From above calculation, cooperative enterprise i has comprehensive impact factor P' i, the
variance is Pi=P'i -
1
n
, then ∑
i=1
n
Pi
'=1 and ∑
i=1
n
∆Pi = 0, ∆Pi is the impact factor variance
between actual situation and theoretical model, which is correction factor of profit allocation of
alliance. 
Suppose there’s a manufacturing and logistics industry alliance that composed of n
enterprises. The total profit interval is V(S) = [V-(S) , V+(S)], then enterprise actual updated
profit allocation is ∆j i '(V) = ∆Pi x V(S), ∆j i '(V) can be positive or negative. Enterprise i actual
profit interval is ji '(V) = ji '(V) + ∆ji '(V). 
j i '(V) = [j i- (V)', j i+ (V)'] = [j i- (V) + ∆j i- (V),j i+(V) + ∆j i+ (V)]
(2)
Because ∑
i=1
n
∆j i '(V) = ∑
i=1
n
(∆Pi x V(S)) = ∑
i=1
n
(∆Pi) x V(S) = 0
Therefore ∑
i=1
n
j i '(V) = ∑
i=1
n
j i (V) + ∑
i=1
n
∆j i '(V) = ∑
i=1
n
j i (V) = V(S)
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The interval Shapley Value method with comprehensive correction factor is more scientific and
reasonable, and more in line with the actual situation. This method facilitates overall
coordination of the alliance, enhances incentive system among alliance members, and hence
ensures the stability of the alliance.
4. Case Study
4.1. Case Description
Suppose there’s an alliance comprises one manufacturing enterprise A and two logistics
enterprises B and C. B, C provides specialized logistics services to A, and the logistics services
are the same. This alliance has taken the project-oriented operation; all three parties have
resources invested in the projects. Suppose A, B and C are rational economic men, who share
full information with maximizing profits as the goal. The profit interval of a cooperation project
is shown in Table 1.
alliance A B C {A,B} {B,C} {A,C} {A,B,C}
profit
interval [10,14] [12,14] [12,16] [32,40] [26,36] [38,44] [54,60]
Table 1. Profit intervals of various A, B, C alliance 
4.2. Pre-improved Profit Allocation with Shapley Interval Value Method
Interval Shapley value is calculated using formula (1) for enterprise A profit allocation, the
results shown in Table 2.
S V(S) V(S\{i}) V(S)⊝V(S\{i}) gS gS(V(S)⊝V(S\{i}))
A [10,14] 0 [10,14] 1/3 [10/3,14/3]
{A,B} [32,40] [12,14] [20,26] 1/6 [20/6,26/6]
{A,C} [38,44] [12,16] [26,28] 1/6 [26/6,28/6]
{A,B,C} [54,60] [26,36] [28,24] 1/3 [28/3,24/3]
Table 2. Enterprise A profit interval based on interval Shapely value
From above table, enterprise A profit interval is jA(V)=[20.33,21.67]. Similarly,
jB(V)=[15.33,17.67], jC(V)=[18.33,20.67].
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4.3. Post-Improved Profit Allocation with Shapley Interval Value Method
4.3.1. Determine the Profit Allocation Indicators and Weights for the Manufacturing
and Logistics Industry Alliance
Based on the characteristics of the manufacturing and logistics industry alliance, this article
builds a profit allocation indicator system choosing risk sharing, collaborative effort,
marketcompetition, innovative contribution and partner’s resource investment as evaluation
factors. See table 3.
Goal Layer Criteria Layer Indicator Layer
profit allocation
indicator system
for manufacturing
and
logistics industry
Alliance C
risk sharing
C1
risk sharing size C11
risk sharing capacity C12
risk sharing willingness C13
probability of failure C14
collaborative efforts
C2
willingness to cooperate C21
system development and execution C22
incentive policy development C23
organizational culture compatibility C24
marketcompetition
C3
marketshare C31
 market growth rate C32
profitability C33
bargaining power C34
innovative
contribution
C4
system innovation C41
technical innovation C42
cultural innovation C43
operational innovation C44
resource
investment
C5
hardware investment C51
software investment C52
human resources investment C53
management investment C54
Table 3. Profit allocation indicator system for manufacturing and logistics industry alliance
W, the set of weights is constructed based on the above method. Take the calculation of
Criteria Layer as an example. Ten experts are invited to evaluate the five assessment factors in
the Criteria Layer to generate an Expert Evaluation Matrix, as shown in Table 4.
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expert C1 C2 C3 C4 C5
1 4 3 3 4 5
2 5 2 3 4 4
3 3 4 2 3 5
4 4 3 3 4 5
5 4 3 4 5 5
6 3 4 3 5 4
7 5 3 2 4 4
8 4 4 3 4 5
9 4 3 4 5 4
10 4 3 3 4 5
Table 4. Expert Evaluation Matrix
get: 
Using MATLAB to calculate the max eigenvalue of Matrix and get a single root max=742.5742,
and its corresponding eigenvector is X*=[0.4638 0.3706 0.3510 0.4894 0.5337]. After
Normalization, get the Criteria Layer weight vector, which is W=[0.210 0.168 0.158 0.222
0.242].
Similarly, combination weight of each evaluation indicator in the goal layer can be calculated.
Then multiplied by the weight of corresponding evaluation factor in the goal layer to get the
combination weight of evaluation indicator in the goal layer respectively, which are,
• Risk sharing weight vector: W1=[0.07518 0.03024 0.04578 0.05880].
• Collaborative efforts weight vector: W2=[0.04519 0.05712 0.03595 0.02974].
• Marketcompetition weight vector: W3=[0.0556 0.04298 0.04076 0.0237].
• Innovative contribution weight vector: W4=[0.5728 0.03685 0.03774 0.09013].
• Resource investment weight vector: W5=[0.06002 0.05348 0.5493 0.07357].
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4.3.2. Calculate Comprehensive Correction Factor of Profit Allocation
Ten subject experts are invited to evaluate manufacturing enterprise A. The evaluation
standard breaks down into 5 classes, which are high, medium high, medium, medium low and
low. The proportions of the number of votes vs. total votes for each class are collected to get
the fuzzy comprehensive evaluation matrix for a single factor, shown as follows: 
Thus, result for enterprise A on risk sharing is B1=W1·R1=[0.1556 0.2984 0.3798 0.1518
0.0144]. Similarly, evolution results for other factors such as collaborative efforts, market
competition, innovative contribution and resource investment can also be calculated. The
criteria layer comprehensive evaluation matrix is:
Per B=W ⊝ R, get B=[0.1285 0.3933 0.2645 0.1625 0.0723]. Then normalize B to get
B'=[0.126 0.385 0.259 0.159 0.071], then multiply B' and fuzzy evaluation vector V to get
enterprise A’s comprehensive impact factor of PA=B'VT=0.5672, where fuzzy evaluation vector
V=[0.9 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.1]. Equally, for enterprise B and C, PB=0.7755, PC=0.8154. After
normalization, the A, B, C profit allocation comprehensive impact factors are PA'=0.2628,
PB'=0.3594 and PC'=0.3778 respectively. Therefore the correction factors for each enterprise
are ∆PA=PA'-1/3=-0.0705, DPB=PB'-1/3=0.026, ∆PC=PC'-1/3=0.0445.
It is worth noting that the dynamic nature of alliance development and the uncertainty in
alliance operation lead to the variation of factor weights. Under different circumstances, such
as in the different stages of alliance development, evaluation for specific factors may fluctuate.
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4.3.3. Calculate Improved Profit Allocation Interval
Using formula (2) to get enterprise A, B, C alliance improved actual profit allocation interval:
jA'(V)=[16.523,17.44], jB'(V)=[16.734,19.23], jC'(V)=[20.733,23.34].
From the above results, after taking into consideration of the risk sharing, collaborative efforts,
market competition, innovative contribution and resource investment, profit allocation interval
for the enterprise A, B and C has been re-adjusted. Profit interval of manufacturing enterprise
A has been reduced, while logistics enterprises B and C profit interval has been increased. The
interval Shapley Value method with comprehensive correction factor is more scientific and
reasonable, and more in line with the actual situation. 
5. Conclusions
Profit allocation between manufacturing and logistics alliance is a complicated issue. In reality,
the alliance partners are often unclear on the expected return or the profit allocation under
different alliance strategy. In addition, during the process of cooperation, many factors affect
the profit allocation and different factors have different importance. This article, based on
manufacturing and logistics industry alliance characteristics, used AHP-GEM method, an
indicator system is established for profit allocation in manufacturing and logistics industry
alliance. Five impact factors are identified for the alliance, which are risk sharing, collaborative
efforts, market competition, innovative contribution and partner resources investment.
Comprehensive impact factors are calculated in profit allocation of each partner using fuzzy
evaluation method. Correction factor is introduced to improve interval Shapley Value method.
An improved model for profit allocation is established for fuzzy cooperative games between
manufacturing and logistics industries. Improved interval Shapley value method is more logical
and reasonable, which has practical value in solving the profit allocation issues of
manufacturing and logistics industry alliance.
Current projects
Anhui Provincial College Level Humanities and Social Sciences Key Research Project "The
manufacturing and logistics industry cooperative game study in low-carbon economy
(SK2012A106)"; China Institute of Logistics research project No. 2012CSLKT105.
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